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Fiscal restraints have been argued to force today’s governments to internalize the externalities 
that result from extensive borrowing on future electorates and governments as well as on 
other countries by causing fiscal instability. In this article we provide an alternative argument 
for fiscal restraints  which is based on an agency perspective on government. A budget 
maximizing politician is better informed than the electorate about the necessary spending to 
ensure the states ability to provide services for the economy. In this respect, the politician is 
an expert in the meaning of the credence good literature. The electorate, being able to observe 
the budget but not the necessary level of spending, will reelect a government if its budget 
does not exceed a critical level. A fiscal restraint limits the maximum spending a government 
will choose if the reelection level is not sufficient to ensure the state’s ability to provide 
services to the economy. We determine when such a fiscal restraint improves voter welfare 
and discuss the role of the opposition in situations where very high levels of spending are 
required. 
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1 Introduction
Government can be seen as the people mandating politicians to look after the pub-
lic affairs. In this sense, politicians serve a similar role as doctors, lawyers or other
experts. If a person feels sick, he or she consults a doctor to identify the cause as
well as potential cures. A successful cure provides a utility from health to pa-
tients. In most cases the patient is not able to check upon neither the diagnosis
nor the choice of the cure. The doctor due to her education and experience has the
expertise to make this decision. The relationship between the people and politi-
cians can be seen in in a similar way: The politician specializes in understanding
public affairs and has a governmental machinery at her disposal to identify and
execute necessary policy interventions so that the people are able to derive a util-
ity from the functioning of the state. Politicians, due to their specialization and
the resources available to them are able to make these decisions and similar to the
example of the doctor, the people are often not able, due to a lack of information
and experience, to check upon the decisions of politicians. To relate to recent pol-
icy debates, most voters cannot determine whether the downturn of the economy
is a normal movement along the business cycle or whether it is a severe economic
crisis and what size of macroeconomic policy intervention is required to overcome
these problems. While no one may have the perfect answer, politicians do have
access to substantial analysis and data to make an informed decision. Similar in
the case of foreign and defense policy, many voters are not able to determine the
severity of external threats to the country and which level of defense spending and
international involvement in conﬂicts is necessary to reduce these threats.
The relationship between the people and politicians, as in the case of patients
and doctors or clients and lawyers, is characterized by asymmetric information
about the true state of the world. Politicians (as well as doctors and lawyers),
decide about actions on behalf of the people (or patients and clients) appropriate
for this state of the world. Often, the appropriate action is the efﬁcient action
given the state of the world.
The theoretical literature on industrial economics has studied extensively theExpert Politicians 2
role of and the incentives for experts – like doctors or specialists in general (see
Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006, for a survey). The goods and services provided
by experts are referred to as credence goods, as the customer needs to trust the
provider to choose the appropriate action given the state of the world. To view the
services of politicians as credence goods has not been considered in the literature.
The present article attempts to close this gap by assuming that politicians are in
the role of experts serving the people that elected them. In doing so we want
to study its implication for the analysis of ﬁscal policy, in particular the role of
constitutional ﬁscal restraints.
The informational asymmetry between the people and their politicians would
be of no concern, if the interests of both parties would be perfectly aligned. We
do not make this assumption. Instead we assume, in line with the public choice
tradition following Buchanan (1967) that politicians are self interested rational
agents who systematically pursue their own goals looking for rents from their
expertise. Drawing the parallels to doctors again, the politician’s as well as the
doctor’sincentivemaybetogoformorecostlyactionsinsteadofthemostefﬁcient
one. In a sense the doctor as well as the politician beneﬁts from large spendings
on their activities. While this incentive may be purely monetary in case of doctors,
for politicians the reward maybe recognition and gratitude from beneﬁciaries that
come with large budgets. In this sense we follow Niskanen’s (1971) argument that
politicians are interested in maximizing public spending.
The people, as the tax payers that have to ﬁnance the budget, can use two
mechanisms to discipline the spending of elected politicians. On the one hand,
they can exert electoral control, that is, they can vote a politician out of ofﬁce
if her expenditure appears to be too excessive. From the perspective of a politi-
cian this implies a loss of future rents from holding ofﬁce. Therefore, people’s
electoral behavior can incentivize politicians to act in the interest of the people.
This argument has been put forward by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) in their
work on political accountability. On the other hand, the people can restrain the
actions of politicians by constitutional rules, for example budget limits. The roleExpert Politicians 3
of such limits on ﬁscal policy has been emphasized in particular by Brennan and
Buchanan (1980).
Both mechanisms, the threat of not being reelected as well as spending limits
come at a cost. Consider ﬁrst the cost of electoral control. To use this as an
incentive, the electorate has to choose a critical level of spending such that the
politician is not reelected if her budget choice exceeds this level. This already
allows the politician to spend more than necessary in time the necessary spending
is below the critical level. Additionally, it implies that if the efﬁcient spending
level, given the true state of the world, exceeds the critical level, then the politician
has to expect to loose ofﬁce. The reason is either that she spends more than the
reelection level or if she chooses a lower level of spending that public affairs
are not dealt with appropriately. Given that she is likely to loose ofﬁce in either
case she has an incentive to choose a maximum budget in the current period to
maximize the rent from ofﬁce in her current last period in ofﬁce. In this article we
identify optimal reelection rules taking this cost of incentivizing politicians into
account.
Consider next the cost of constitutional spending limits. While such a limit
reduces the maximum spending that can occur if a politician does not expect to be
reelected, it implies that in some cases politicians are not able to ensure that public
affairs are handled. These costs are the higher, the more likely it is that very high
levels of public spending are needed. We characterize a condition when such a
constitutional spending limit improves voter welfare under the assumption that the
constitution does not allow any exemption from the spending limit. The condition
isasintuitiveasitisrestrictive: Introducingaspendinglimitisoptimal, ifandonly
if the probability of the state of the world that requires very high levels of spending
is small compared to the loss in utility that the people experience if public affairs
cannot be dealt with. For supporters of constitutional spending limits, this should
be bad news as it is likely that the loss of utility may be large and the probability of
severe spending requirements may be seen as non-negligible. Most rules currently
discussed specify exemptions that allow politicians under certain circumstances toExpert Politicians 4
exceed the limit. However, if such an exception allows the politician in power to
determine whether these circumstances apply, we are back to a situation without
a spending limit. For this reason we analyze a rule where an exception can only
be triggered if the opposition agrees that the circumstances apply. We assume that
the opposition similar to the politician in power has better information about the
public affairs and the required level of spending. We show that a constitutional
spending limit that requires support by the opposition in case of a government
exceeding the spending limit always improves voter welfare. We characterize
the optimal electoral behavior of voters such that the opposition agrees to the
government exceeding the spending limit if and only if this is required by the true
state of the world.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
related literature and further elaborates on the key idea of this paper. Section
3 introduces the model. Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium public budget
in a benchmark scenario with full information. Section 5 then establishes the
equilibrium budget with expert politicians. Section 6 introduces a ﬁscal restraint
on the public budget and identiﬁes the conditions under which such a restraint
improves voter welfare. Section 7 considers the role oft the opposition in applying
a ﬁscal restraint. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
While this paper provides an agency argument why ﬁscal restraints on government
spending can be welfare increasing, an existing literature on such restraints fo-
cusses on problems of externalities, either affecting future generations or affecting
othercountries. Theexistingtheoreticalexplanationsforsuchpolicyinterventions
based on intergenerational equity arguments assumes an externality given that the
current generations of politicians and voters decide about how much to borrow,
inﬂating the beneﬁt and discounting the restrictions this imposes on future gen-
erations more than it is deemed to be equitable. The externality stems from theExpert Politicians 5
assumption that the current generation does not internalize, in a Ricardian sense,
the cost it imposes on future generations. This assumption applies if not everyone
in a society cares about the next generation – some may simply have no children
to care about (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962).
An alternative story, leading to a similar outcome, is that current governments
may overspend to limit the manoeuverability of a future government if the in-
cumbent does not expect to be reelected (Persson and Svenson, 1989, Tabellini
and Alesina ,1990). Apart from the intergenerational externality argument, von
Hagen and Eichengreen (1996) look at stabilization policies arguing that ﬁscal re-
straints may be needed to limit ﬁscal externalities on countries with close ties to
the economy in question, in particular in the case of a currency union. Note that in
the presence of any externality – whether intergenerational or between countries
– no agency problem between governments and their electorate exists. Even if
preferences of politicians and (concurrent) voters are perfectly aligned, inefﬁcient
allocations may result. Our arguments are based on the assumption of inﬁnitely
lived voters within in a (closed) economy, hence we explicitly abstract from inter-
generational as well as international externality issues. In this sense the argument
for ﬁscal restraints established in this paper is complementary to the existing lit-
erature emphasizing externalities.
As indicated above we add the analysis of ﬁscal restraints to the discussion of
agency problems – a literature that started with Barro (1973) under the heading
of political accountability. Barro (1973) showed that if preferences of the govern-
ment and its electorate are not perfectly aligned then the electorate has to offer
the incumbent some rent of holding ofﬁce to incentivize the government not to
pursue its own goal because it will be voted out of ofﬁce for sure. As Barro,
we rule out any intergenerational or cross-national externalities by assuming that
voters are Ricardian in the sense of taking into account any future tax payments
that have to be paid given a government’s budget decision. We identify the rent
from power that has to be offered to incumbents to incentivize them not to exploit
their position. Where Barro assumed perfect information, Ferejohn (1986) addedExpert Politicians 6
asymmetric information. In Ferejohn’s model, the electorate cannot observe the
activities of the government but is only able to assess the government’s perfor-
mance. The electorate thus needs to incentivize politicians by a reelection rule to
act in the interest of the public.
Persson et al. (1997) elaborate on Ferejohn’s approach by analyzing how the
separation of powers can help to elicit information on government activities and
contain rent seeking behavior of politicians. We differ from this literature by set-
ting up the information problem as a credence good problem. Voters can observe
the budget chosen by the government and they can observe its effect on their own
well-being. However, voters cannot fully assess whether the extent of the budget
was necessary to achieve this outcome. Only politician can observe the true state
of the world and this state determines the minimum necessary government budget.
Similar to Persson et al. (1997) we are able to distinguish between a Barro type
rent from power and an information rent of the politician. Furthermore and more
importantly we are able to present a rational for a constitutional ﬁscal restraint as
an instrument to limit the Barro type as well as the information rent of incumbents.
Fiscal restraints are a common theme in the public choice literature, classic ex-
amples being Brennan and Buchanan (1980) and Wilson (1989) using a Leviathan
concept of government in which politicians just maximize the size of the bud-
get and electoral pressure does not limit this tendency. The only article, to our
knowledge, discussing ﬁscal restraints with an agency perspective on government
is Besley and Smart (2007). These authors study the role of ﬁscal restraints in
the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection where politicians can be ei-
ther good, i.e. always work in the interest of the electorate, or bad, i.e. pursuing
self-serving concerns. The latter are able to divert rents as the incumbent has in-
formationaboutthecostofthepublicgood. Fiscalrestraintsinthismodelareused
to select the right politicians as well as to limit rents extracted by bad incumbents.
One interesting ﬁnding is that introducing ﬁscal restraints may only be welfare
enhancing if the frequency of bad politicians is low. We differ from this model
by assuming the information asymmetry based on the credence goods perspectiveExpert Politicians 7
(see Darby and Karni, 1973, for the classic reference, Dulleck and Kerschbamer,
2006, for a survey of the theoretical literature and Dulleck et al., 2011, for experi-
mental evidence). We ﬁnd reasons for implementing constitutional rules that limit
government spending without assuming that different types of agents are present.
Furthermore, ﬁscal restraints are welfare diminishing if the probability of severe
cost shocks to the economy are relatively likely.
We argue that elected politicians – the government – are chosen by the elec-
torate to decide on the level of government spending. The necessary level of
spending depends on the state of the economy, i.e., in some situations high levels
of spending are necessary whereas in others low levels sufﬁce. While politicians
care about the functioning of the economy, they are also interested in maximizing
the budget, in line with the Niskanen (1971) model popular in the public choice
literature. The politician serves as an expert in the sense of the credence goods
literature in that she can access information and use resources not easily acces-
sible to the general public, i.e. politicians are the only ones that can observe the
minimum level of spending needed to ensure the functioning of the economy. The
crucial assumption in the credence goods literature is that the expert, in our model
the politician, is able to observe the state of the world, that is, the need of the
customer (the people), and that the expert provides an action to ensure that the
customer derives a utility. Whenever the action chosen is equal to or higher than
the needed action then the customer derives a discrete beneﬁt. Exceeding the nec-
essary action, however, does not add to the customer’s utility but may increase the
rent of the expert. This provides incentives for the expert to choose an action that
is excessive given the customer’s need. The literature on credence goods refers
in this situation to overtreatment. Our model of budget maximizing politicians
lives from a similar tension. While the politician wants to maximize the budget,
the marginal beneﬁt to the people is zero. The credence good type information
asymmetry combined with the conﬂict of interest over the level of government
spending, induces the electorate to use reelection probabilities to incentivize the
government not to spend too much, similar to the ideas put forward in the litera-Expert Politicians 8
ture on political accountability by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986).
Another paper that is related to our approach is Yared (2010). This author
assumes pure rent seeking politicians who are able to extract rents due to tempo-
rary economic shocks. These shocks generate changes in tax revenue and in the
need for expenditure thus allowing governments to build up a tax base that can be
diverted for rent appropriation. In the model the voters reelection decision puts
restrictions on taxes levied as well as minimum levels of public spending. While a
benevolent government would impose constant tax rates to limit the excess burden
of taxation, taxes with rent seeking politicians will be volatile as citizens trade off
the beneﬁt of constant taxes with the cost of potential appropriation by the gov-
ernment. We differ from Yared by studying a problem of asymmetric information
where only a too limited budget can be identiﬁed by the electorate. Furthermore,
we explicitly discuss the role of ﬁscal restraints.
3 The Model
Time is discrete and divided into legislative periods. In each legislative period t,
public affairs require a budget of at least qt currency units. The variable qt is ran-
domly drawn from the interval [0, ¯ q]. We assume that qt is identically distributed
and serially uncorrelated over time, with continuous density f and cumulative
distribution function F.
If the public budget in period t, denoted by bt, is smaller than qt, public affairs
cannot be handled appropriately and this has a negative impact on the welfare of
the electorate. In contrast, if the public budget at time t equals or exceeds qt, pub-
lic affaires can be treated appropriately, but the exceeding amount bt  qt is slack
in the sense that it does not contribute to the electorate’s welfare. We assume that
the public budget is bounded from above, so that bt  ¯ q in each legislative period
t. This implies that the public budget can never exceed the largest amount possi-
ble, that is required to handle public affairs. Note that we do not limit the budget
otherwise, i.e., we assume that the ﬁnancial base - tax base as well as access to ﬁ-Expert Politicians 9
nancial markets - is sufﬁcient to deal with any possible budgetary need. Moreover,
we do not distinguish between tax and debt ﬁnanced public funds. Since voters
will be assumed to face an inﬁnite time horizon, they fully internalize future tax
burdens associated with current deﬁcits. As a consequence, voters are indifferent
between tax and debt ﬁnanced public funds and only care about the level of public
spending.
The electorate consists of a unit-measure continuum of identical and inﬁnitely







where d represents a discount factor commonly employed by both voters and
incumbent politicians, E is the expectations operator, and v denotes the single-
period utility of the representative voter which depends on the size of the public
budget and the realization of q in this period. The representative voter’s single-
period preferences are deﬁned as
v(bt,qt)=
(
f  bt, if bt   qt,
 bt, if bt < qt.
(2)
Thus, if the public budget is sufﬁciently large to handle public affairs appropri-
ately, the representative voter enjoys a beneﬁt amounting to f > ¯ q and, at the
same time, forgoes private consumption in an amount equal to the public budget.
The assumption f > ¯ q implies that it is always efﬁcient to handle public affairs
appropriately. If, in contrast, the public budget is too small to handle public affairs
appropriately, the representative voter receives no beneﬁt from public ﬁnance and
only forgoes private consumption equal to the public budget.





d jbt+j, (3)Expert Politicians 10
thatis, theincumbentisassumedtobeabudgetmaximizer. Votersandincumbents
discount future beneﬁts at the same factor d. This is in accord with the idea that
politicians are part of the population. Generally, a politician can be reelected
inﬁnitely often. However, only during incumbency the politician directly derives
utility from the size of the public budget. Once voted out of ofﬁce, the politician’s
preferences are similar to that of (other) voters. We assume that in the event an
incumbent is thrown out of ofﬁce, the incumbent is replaced by another politician
and is never reappointed.1 Alternate politicians are always available who, once
in ofﬁce, pursue the same objective – maximizing the public budget – as their
predecessors.
Voters employ a speciﬁc voting rule in order to control the budget maximizing
behavior of the incumbent. At the beginning of each legislative period t voters
bind themselves to a voting rule that they will follow at the end of the legislative
period. This rule conditions their voting behavior on the information they gather
within the legislative period. The incumbent is aware of the voting rule. Then,
nature decides on the realization of qt and, hence, on the minimum size of the
public budget, necessary to handle public affairs. In the full information scenario
both voters and the incumbent observe qt, whereas in the asymmetric information
scenario qt is only revealed to the incumbent. Once the incumbent has learned
the realization of qt, she chooses the budget bt. Finally, voters either reelect the
incumbent or vote her out of ofﬁce based on the voting rule, they have committed
to at the beginning of the legislative period. If the incumbent is voted out, she is
replaced by a new incumbent who has the same budget maximizing attitude and
is in all other respects identical to the incumbent.
We follow Ferejohn (1986) and Persson et al. (1997) in determining the voting
equilibrium. The assumption of ex ante commitment to a voting rule is a sequen-
tial equilibrium, i.e., voters have no incentive to change the rule at the end of the
legislative period, if they are indifferent between the incumbent and an opposing
1Persson et al. (1997) employ a similar assumption. Ferejohn (1986) also considers the case
that a politician may return.Expert Politicians 11
politician. Note that voters only commit to a voting rule within a single legislative
period. That is, voters cannot commit to voting behavior in future legislative pe-
riods. Instead, when deciding on the voting rule, current voters take into account
that voting behavior in future periods must be in the interest of the electorate at
that time. Figure 1 illustrates the sequence of events within a single legislative
period.









according to voting rule
Figure 1: Sequence of events within a legislative period
In the following, we ﬁrst assume that both the incumbent and the voters ob-
serve the state of nature qt at each period t. Subsequently, we consider the more
relevant case that only the incumbent can observe qt. In the latter case the in-
cumbent is said to be an expert politician. We consider situations without and
with ﬁscal restraints and provide a welfare comparison for this informational set-
ting. In section 7, where we discuss the role of the opposition in allowing the
government to break a ﬁscal restraint, we allow for the government as well as an
opposition, but not the electorate, being able to observe qt.
4 Full Information Equilibrium
If both, the incumbent and the voters can observe qt, voters can easily commit to
vote out the incumbent if either bt > qt or bt < qt, the latter implying v(bt,qt)=
 bt. Intheformercasetheincumbenthaschosenabudgetlargerthannecessaryto
handle public affairs and in the latter case a budget smaller than necessary. While
the latter case can generally be ruled out by the incumbent’s inclination to choose
a larger rather than a smaller budget, the former case needs to be considered just
because of this inclination. In fact, a strict rule to vote the incumbent out of ofﬁceExpert Politicians 12
if bt 6= qt is generally not optimal as if qt turns out to be small, the incumbent
would prefer to choose bt = ¯ q and being thrown out of ofﬁce at the end of the
legislative period, rather than striving for another term in ofﬁce by choosing bt =
qt. In order to weaken the incumbent’s incentives to choose a maximum budget
when she observes a small qt, voters must allow the incumbent a certain minimum
budget. Let the minimum budget in legislative period t be denoted by ˆ b
f
t , with
superindex f indicating the full information scenario. Then, the reelection rule in
legislative periodt speciﬁes that voters reelect the incumbent if she spends at most
the budget ˆ b
f
t , for the case that qt turns out to be small, i.e., qt  ˆ b
f
t . Furthermore,
the reelection rule in legislative periodt speciﬁes that voters reelect the incumbent
if bt = qt for the case that qt > ˆ b
f
t . Given that voters aim to minimize spending
and politician’s incentive, the minimum budget ˆ b
f




















qt+jdF(qt+j)= ¯ q, (4)
where ˆ b
f
t+j is the minimum budget voters deﬁne in legislative period t + j. The
left hand side of equation (4) measures the expected utility of the incumbent in
the case that she observes qt  ˆ b
f
t in period t and chooses bt = ˆ b
f
t , so that she
becomes reelected at the end of period t. The right hand side of equation (4) is
the utility of the incumbent if she chooses the maximum budget in period t and
is voted out of ofﬁce at the end of period t. Since qt is serially uncorrelated and
identically distributed over time, the minimum budget assumes the same amount









qdF(q)= ¯ q. (5)
We are now in a position to state the following result.2
2Proofs are delegated to the Appendix.Expert Politicians 13
Proposition 1 Under full information the equilibrium budget is given by
bf =
(
ˆ bf, if q < ˆ bf,
q, if q   ˆ bf.
For d <
¯ q
¯ q+E(q) the minimum budget satisﬁes ˆ bf > 0 and is implicitly determined
by condition (5), where E(q) is the expected value of q over its full support. For
d  
¯ q
¯ q+E(q) the minimum budget satisﬁes ˆ bf = 0. For d approaching to zero, the
minimum budget ˆ bf approaches ¯ q.
Figure 2 illustrates the results stated in Proposition 1. The left diagram plots
the equilibrium budget bf as a function of the state of nature q. The right diagram
illustrates how the minimum budget ˆ bf depends on the discount factor d. Note
that under full information the more patient the incumbent the lower is the rent the
electorate has to offer. This ramiﬁcation has ﬁrst been identiﬁed by Barro(1973).
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Figure 2: Equilibrium budget with full informationExpert Politicians 14
5 Asymmetric Information Equilibrium
Under asymmetric information the incumbent observes qt in legislative period t,
whereas voters do not. Voters observe the budget bt and they observe whether the
public affairs are handled appropriately because only then they receive the beneﬁt
f from public ﬁnance. As a consequence, voters cannot make the voting rule
contingent on qt, but only on bt and on whether they receive the beneﬁt f.
Consider the following voting rule. If either the budget bt exceeds a certain
cutoff budget ˆ ba
t , with superindex a indicating the asymmetric information sce-
nario, or if the budget bt is too small to handle public affairs appropriately (that is,
if voters do not receive the beneﬁt f from public ﬁnance), the incumbent is voted
out of ofﬁce at the end of period t. Otherwise, the incumbent is reappointed for
another legislative period. Then, if the cutoff budget is properly set, the incumbent
will choose bt = ˆ ba
t if she observes qt  ˆ ba
t and bt = ¯ q if she observes qt > ˆ ba
t .
The representative voter in period t chooses a cutoff budget that maximizes









d j(f   ¯ q)[1 F(bt+j)]
subject to the constraint, that the incumbent does not ﬁnd the cutoff budget ˆ ba
t to





d jbt+jF(bt+j)   ¯ q.




ˆ baF(ˆ ba)= ¯ q (6)
if the constraint does bind. If, in contrast, the constraint does not bind, the cutoff
budget is determined by the following ﬁrst order condition
 F(ˆ ba)  ˆ baf(ˆ ba)+ ¯ q f(ˆ ba)=0. (7)Expert Politicians 15
In both cases the cutoff budget chosen by the voters will be the same in all periods
so that the index t has again been omitted. The next lemma speciﬁes when ˆ ba is
determined by (6) or by (7), respectively.
Lemma 1 There is some discount factor ˜ d 2 (0,1) so that for d < ˜ d the cutoff
budget ˆ ba is determined by the constraint (6) and for d   ˜ d the cutoff budget ˆ ba is
determined by the ﬁrst order condition (7).
In light of Lemma 1 the equilibrium budget under asymmetric information can
be characterized as follows.
Proposition 2 Under asymmetric information, the equilibrium budget is given by
ba =
(
ˆ ba, if q  ˆ ba,
¯ q if q > ˆ ba,
where ˆ ba is determined by the constraint (6) if d < ˜ d and by the ﬁrst order condi-
tion (7) if d   ˜ d.
Figure 3 illustrates the result stated in Proposition 2. The left diagram plots
the equilibrium budget ba as a function of the state of nature q. The right digram
illustrates how the cutoff budget ˆ ba depends on the discount factor d.
The next proposition provides a comparison between the full information and
the asymmetric information equilibrium.
Proposition 3 ba > bf for q 2 [0, ¯ q]\{ˆ ba, ¯ q} and ba = bf for q 2{ˆ ba, ¯ q}.
The rents resulting from the difference between the two reelection budgets can
be seen as a measure of the information rent the incumbent receives in our model.
Such a rent has ﬁrst been identiﬁed by Ferejohn (1986).Expert Politicians 16
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Figure 3: Equilibrium budget with asymmetric information
6 Introducing a Fiscal Restraint on the Budget
Assumenowthattheelectoratecanwriteaﬁscalrestraintonthepublicbudgetinto
the constitution. We will refer to such a restraint as a budget cap. The constitution
states that in each legislative period t the budget bt must not exceed a predeﬁned
cap on the budget, denoted as ¯ b  ¯ q. In the following we conﬁne attention to
the case that information is asymmetrically distributed between voters and the
incumbent.3
In the presence of a budget cap ¯ b, the representative voter chooses a cutoff













d j¯ b[1 F(¯ b)]
3Under full information a budget cap will not be used by the electorate if the government
cannot go over this budget even if the electorate agrees to the government doing so. If, in contrast,
the constitutional rule allows the government to go over the limit if the electorate agrees to a higher
budget, then the rent of power can be reduced to zero by a budget cap equal to ¯ b = 0. The rule will
then be invoked in every period.
4We use the term cutoff budget or level, when talking about the reelection policy chosen by






d jbt+jF(bt+j)   ¯ b.




ˆ bcF(ˆ bc)=¯ b. (8)
where the index t again has been omitted as the voters choose the same cutoff
level ˆ bc in each legislative period, and the superindex c indicates the presence of
a constitutional ﬁscal restraint or budget cap. Equation (8) implicitly deﬁnes the






1 d +d[F(ˆ bc)+ˆ bcf(ˆ bc)]
> 0.
If the constraint does not bind, the cutoff level in the presence of a ﬁscal restraint
is determined by the following ﬁrst order condition
 F(ˆ bc)  ˆ bcf(ˆ bc)+¯ bf(ˆ bc)=0, (9)
which again implies the cutoff budget as a function ˆ b = ˆ ba(¯ b).





(f   ˆ bc)F(ˆ bc)+(f   ¯ b)[F(¯ b) F(ˆ bc)]  ¯ b[1 F(¯ b)]
 
,
where ˆ ba is either determined by the constraint (8) or by the ﬁrst order condition












where the term in square brackets vanishes if the cutoff budget ˆ bc is determined
by the ﬁrst order condition (9). This leads us to the following result.Expert Politicians 18
Proposition 4
i. Let d < ˜ d. Then, lowering the budget cap ¯ b starting from ¯ b = ¯ q increases
voter welfare if and only if




ii. Let d   ˜ d. Then, lowering the budget cap ¯ b starting from ¯ b = ¯ q increases
voter welfare if and only if
f f( ¯ q) < 1 F(ˆ bc).
Generally, loweringthebudgetcapincreasesvoterwelfareiftheexpectedmar-
ginal costs of a lower budget cap are smaller than the expected marginal beneﬁts.
At ¯ b = ¯ q the expected marginal costs of a lower budget cap are given by f f( ¯ q)
per legislative period. Lowering the budget cap implies that it may happen that
q turns out to be larger than the maximum budget the incumbent is allowed to
choose, in which case the public budget will be too small to handle the public
affairs appropriately. Then, voters forgo the beneﬁt from public affairs amounting
to f. The marginal likelihood that this happens is given by f( ¯ q) when the budget
cap is lowered by one currency unit starting from ¯ b = ¯ q.
The expected marginal beneﬁts of a lower budget cap per legislative period
depend on whether the constraint on the cutoff budget ˆ bc is binding or not. This
depends on the condition on the discount rate derived in section 5. Consider ﬁrst
the case that d   ˜ d so that the cutoff budget ˆ bc is determined by the unconstrained
solution. If the incumbent observes a q that is larger than the cutoff budget ˆ bc,
she will choose the maximum budget ¯ b. The probability for this to happen is
1 F(ˆ bc). Thus, if the budget cap is lowered by one currency unit, the voters
receive an expected marginal beneﬁt in the form of a lower maximum budget
amounting to 1 F(ˆ bc).
If d > ˜ d, that is, if the cutoff level ˆ bc is determined by the constrained solution,
voters receive an additional marginal beneﬁt of a lower budget cap. In the con-
strained solution voters actually prefer a lower cutoff budget but are constrainedExpert Politicians 19
to allow the incumbent a budget sufﬁciently high so that the incumbent does not
choose the maximum budget in all states of nature. Since voters would actually
prefer a lower cutoff budget, the term  F(ˆ bc) ˆ bcf(ˆ bc)+¯ bf(ˆ bc) is negative. This
is because the term measures the marginal increase in voter welfare per legislative
period if the cutoff level is increased.5 If this term was positive, this would imply
that ˆ bc could not be the constrained solution as voters would prefer a higher cutoff
level and, at the same time, the incumbent’s incentives to choose the maximum
budget in all states of nature could be weakened. With a budget cap, the rents the
incumbent can extract from holding ofﬁce by having the opportunity to choose
the maximum budget decrease. As a consequence, the budget cap enables voters
to enforce a lower cutoff level which in the constrained solution increases voter
welfare.
Whether the introduction of a budget cap increases expected voter welfare
essentially hinges on the distribution of q. If the density of q is thick for large q,
that is, if states of nature are likely to occur in which a large budget is necessary
to handle public affairs, the introduction of a budget cap can not be expected to
contribute to voter welfare. In contrast, if the density is thin for large q, a case for
a budget cap arises.
The desirability of a budget cap also hinges on the discount factor d. If the
discount factor is small, the incumbent is more inclined to choose the maximum
budget irrespective of the state of nature in order to immediately extract the rents
from ofﬁce. A budget cap reduces the maximum budget the incumbent can choose
and, thus, weakens her incentives to deploy this strategy. Therefore, the introduc-
tion of a budget cap is more likely to be beneﬁcial if the discount factor d is small
and the constraint on the cutoff budget is binding.6
5The argument for  F(ˆ bc)  ˆ bcf(ˆ bc)+¯ bf(ˆ bc) to be negative in the constrained solution does
not rely on the assumption that voter welfare is concave for all b 2 [0, ¯ q]. It simply follows from
the fact that in the constrained solution voters are constrained to further lower the cutoff level.
6Note that ˜ d, that is, the discount factor below which the constraint on the cutoff budget ˆ bc
binds, generally depends on the budget cap. This is readily veriﬁed as follows. For d = ˜ d, equa-
tions (8) and (9) imply the same cutoff budget ˆ bc. Together, these two equations then determine
the cutoff budget ˆ bc and the discount factor ˜ d as functions of the budget cap ¯ b.Expert Politicians 20
Generally, the budget cap that maximizes voter welfare is determined by the
following ﬁrst order condition
f f(¯ b) 1+F(ˆ bc)+[ F(ˆ bc) ˆ bcf(ˆ bc)+¯ bf(ˆ bc)]
dˆ bc
d¯ b
0, with 0 = if ¯ b < ¯ q,
(11)
which can be inferred from equation(10). The next result characterizes the prop-
erties of an optimal budget cap.
Corollary 1 Let either the condition stated in Proposition 4.i hold for d < ˜ d or
the condition stated in Proposition4.ii hold for d   ˜ d. Then, there exists some
budget cap ¯ b⇤ with ˆ bc < ¯ b⇤ < ¯ q that maximizes voter welfare.
The following two examples determine the cutoff budgets without a budget
cap, ˆ ba, and with a budget cap, ˆ bc, where condition (11) has been employed to
determine the optimal budget cap ¯ b⇤. The ﬁrst example is the case where the in-
troduction of a cap is welfare diminishing. In the second example the introduction
of a cap is welfare enhancing.
Example 1 Let q be uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Then, ˜ d = 2
3. For d < 2
3
the cutoff budget is determined by the constrained solution and amounts to ˆ ba =
[
p
1+2d  3d2 (1 d)]/2d > 1
2. For d   2
3 the cutoff budget is determined by
theunconstrainedsolutionandamountsto ˆ ba = 1
2. Inneithercasetheintroduction
of a budget cap ¯ b < ¯ q is beneﬁcial for voters.
Example 2 Let q be distributed on [0,1] according to the triangular distribution
function F(q)=2q  q2. Then, ˜ d = 0.672. The introduction of a budget cap is
beneﬁcialforthevoters. Table1providesnumericalsolutionsofthecutoffbudgets
with and without a budget cap, ˆ ba and ˆ bc, and in the presence of an optimal budget
cap ¯ b⇤. In all cases f = 1.1 has been assumed.Expert Politicians 21
d ˆ ba ˆ bc ¯ b⇤
0.6 0.478 0.410 0.812
0.9 0.423 0.405 0.947
Table 1: Cutoff budgets and budget caps with triangular distribution
7 The Role of the Opposition
The previous section has identiﬁed the conditions under with a ﬁscal restraint in
the form of a binding budget cap may be beneﬁcial for voters. The problem with
the ﬁscal restraint is that it may turn out to be too restrictive. This is the case when
unfortunate outcomes are likely to happen. Therefore, it is tempting to somehow
allow the incumbent to choose a budget that exceeds the budget cap if q turns
out to be larger than the budget cap. Clearly, this must not be at the discretion
of the incumbent because then the budget cap is not suited anymore to restrain
her budget maximizing attitude. However, as this section demonstrates, there is
still an opportunity to fruitfully employ a constitutional ﬁscal restraint without
running into the risk that the government is too restrained to handle unfortunate
macroeconomic events appropriately.
In the following we again consider a constitutional rule that imposes a cap
on the government budget. We now allow this rule to specify when an exception
may apply. We assume that such rules will always require agreement from the
opposition, as it is the case in many countries where constitutional rules can only
changed with two-third majorities which are very rare. We assume that opposition
politicians have the same access to information as the government. While the
electorate is still not able to observe q, the government as well as the opposition
are. The opposition hence serves as a second expert who wants to get into power,
as indicated earlier we assume that there are no programmatic differences between
the government and the opposition. While our assumption that the government
and the opposition have the same access to information about the state of theExpert Politicians 22
world may be simplistic, in many countries the opposition has certainly better
information than the public due to parliamentary rights and services as well as
access to think tanks related to the opposition. Thus, our assumption of access to
the same information may serve as a good assumption to get ﬁrst insights intof the
effect of rules specifying exceptions to the budget cap.
We ask again, how can the electorate incentivize the government to only apply
for exceeding the budget cap if this is necessary, i.e. if q > ¯ b. At the same time,
we need to ensure that the opposition will only agree to a budget exceeding the
cap, if this is necessary to ensure that public affairs can be handled. We study the
following voting rule: As before, the representative voter chooses at the beginning
of the legislative period a voting rule, that he applies at the end of the period.
The government as well as the opposition learn this voting rule. The voting rule
now speciﬁes certain reelection of the incumbent if the budget does not exceed a
reelection cutoff and the public affairs are handled. If the government exceeds the
cutoff and does not apply to exceed the constitutional budget cap the incumbent
loses ofﬁce for sure and the opposition takes over. If the government applies for
exceeding the budget cap, the opposition has to decide whether it agrees or not. If
it does not agree and the government sets a budget equal to the budget cap but fails
to handle public affairs, then the incumbent stays in ofﬁce. If public affairs can be
handled with a budget smaller or equal to b then the opposition gets elected. If the
opposition agrees and the government sets a budget above b and the government
is able to handle public affairs then the incumbent will be reelected in period t
with probability pt and with probability 1  pt the opposition gets into power.
This rule provides the incumbent with the incentive to apply for exceeding
the budget, i.e., b = ¯ q if q > ¯ b. The opposition has an incentive to agree if and
only if this is the case. The voting rule differs from the rule above as it now
speciﬁes a probability pt of reelection in the case that the government applies
for a budget exceeding the cap and the opposition agrees and public affairs are
handled apppopriately.
The representative voter at time t chooses a cutoff budget and a probability ptExpert Politicians 23














d j(f   ¯ b)[1 F(¯ b)]









d jpt+j 1 ¯ q[1 F(¯ b)   ¯ b.
Obviously, the constraint becomes less binding if pt is larger. Therefore, voters
will choose the highest possible probability pt to reelect the incumbent in the case
that the incumbent requests the budget bt = ¯ q and the opposition approves. Given
that any positive probability sufﬁces to incentivize the opposition to agree if a high
budget is required, voters will choose a pt arbitrarily close to 1. For simplicity we







¯ q[1 F(¯ b)] = ¯ b, (12)
if the constraint binds, and by
 F(ˆ bo)  ˆ bof(ˆ bo)+¯ bf(ˆ bo)=0 (13)
if not. Again, the time index t has been omitted as voters are concerned with the
same calculus in each legislative period t. The superindex o indicates a cutoff
level chosen by the voter in the presence of a budget cap that can be exceeded if
approved by the opposition. Conditions (12) and (13) both determine the cutoff
budget ˆ bo as a function of the budget cap ¯ b. In case that the cutoff budget is






1 d +d[F(ˆ bc)+ˆ bcf(ˆ bc)]
> 0.Expert Politicians 24
The maximum voter welfare that can be achieved given the presence of a budget





(f   ˆ bo)F(ˆ bo)+(f   ¯ b)[F(¯ b) F(ˆ bo)]+(f   ¯ q)[1 F(¯ b)]
 
,
where ˆ bo is either determined by the constraint (12) or by the ﬁrst order condition







 F(¯ b)+F(ˆ bo)+(¯ q   ¯ b)f(¯ b)





where again the term in square brackets is negative if the cutoff budget ˆ bo is de-
termined by the constraint (12) and vanishes if the cutoff budget ˆ bo is determined
by the ﬁrst order condition (13). From (14) the following inference can be drawn.
Proposition 5 The introduction of a budget cap ¯ b that can only be exceeded by
the incumbent if approved by the opposition always increases voter welfare.
Proposition 5 implies that in the case that the budget cap ¯ b can only be ex-
ceeded if approved by the opposition, an optimal budget cap ¯ b⇤ exists for all dis-
tributions of q and all f > ¯ q. The optimal budget cap satisﬁes ˆ bo < ¯ b⇤ < ¯ q.7
Figure 4 illustrates the equilibrium budget if a budget cap amounting to ¯ b⇤, which
can only be exceeded if approved by the opposition, is written in the constitution.
For q 2 [0,ˆ bo] the incumbent chooses the budget b = ˆ bo and is reelected for
another term in ofﬁce, for q 2 (ˆ bo,¯ b⇤] the incumbent chooses the budget b = ¯ b⇤
and is thrown out of ofﬁce, and for q 2 (¯ b⇤, ¯ q] the incumbent chooses the budget
b = ¯ q and is reelected for another term in ofﬁce with probability p arbitrarily
close to 1. Clearly, the levels of b = ˆ bo and b = ¯ b⇤ depend on the distribution
of q and on the discount factor d. The following example continues example 1
7The proof is similar to the proof of Corollary 1.Expert Politicians 25
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Figure 4: Equilibrium budget with budget cap
above and determines the optimal cutoff budget and the budget cap for the case
of a uniform distribution, where the introduction of a budget cap was welfare
diminishing without the exception mechanism.
Example 3 Let q be uniformly distributed on [0,1]. In this case ˜ d = 3
7 if the
budget cap is chosen optimally. For d < 3
7 the cutoff budget b = ˆ bo falls from 1
2
to 1
3 with increasing d and the optimal budget cap b = ¯ b⇤ increases from 1
2 to 2
3.
For d   3
7 the cutoff budget b = ˆ bo becomes 1
3 and the optimal budget cap b = ¯ b⇤
becomes 2
3. Figure 5 illustrates this example.
The intuition why a ﬁscal restraint with an exception requiring the opposi-
tion’s agreement always improves welfare is that the opposition, having access to
information as good as that of the government, serves as a second expert in case
the state of the world requires very high spending levels. This eliminates the cost
of the ﬁscal restraint in cases of very high budgetary requirements.Expert Politicians 26
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Figure 5: Example 3
8 Conclusions
In this article we have shown that introducing a ﬁscal restraint on the public bud-
get can be welfare enhancing even if voters are fully rational and no intergenera-
tional or international externalities exist. Our argument is based on the assumption
of politicians serving as experts. Access to more and better information or sim-
ply specialization allows elected politicians to aggregate and interpret information
such that they have better information than the electorate about the funds needed
to handle public affairs and/or to avoid a crisis. The electorate, on the other hand,
can only observe the budget and whether public affairs are handled, but does not
know what funds are needed to do so. We have shown that very strict constitu-
tional rules are welfare enhancing if the need for very high budgets is relatively
rare. If high budgets may be frequent then any constitutional rule will lead to
welfare losses and only if it is amended by rules allowing for exceptions can this
be an instrument to enhance welfare for sure.
Our article presents a novel perspective on the need for government control
given agency problems and the often discrete loss of a too tight level of control
the government may fail to deliver. We have shown that rules for reelection canExpert Politicians 27
serve to some extent to incentivize governments to limit spending and that ﬁscal
restraints can decrease these agency costs further by limiting spending in periods
where politicians know to lose ofﬁce. The cost is that in some situations, call it a
crisis, the government may not be able to access the funds to handle public affairs.
Our model also implies a political business cycle. If the reign of a government
comes to its end, or if it is likely to be voted out of power, it will increase spend-
ing. We share with Rogoff (1990) the fact that such behavior follows from the
agency problem a rational electorate faces when it tries to incentivize politicians
and it is not due to the fact of myopia or limited rationality of the electorate as in
older models of the political cycle (see, e.g., Nordhaus, 1975). In these models,
government spending will increase, in particular if an election is close, because
the incumbent will spend heavily on observable government expenditure to in-
crease her chance to stay in power. In our model, government spending is high,
because the increased risk of losing power in a tight election implies that politi-
cians go for the immediate utility of an increased budget instead of an uncertain
future in ofﬁce. Aidt et al (2011) show that tight margins in elections are corre-
lated with increased spending. Unfortunately, it is not possible to tell whether the
high spending increases the chance to lose ofﬁce or whether it indeed increases
the incumbents probability to stay in ofﬁce. Litchig and Morrison (2010) report
on Brazilian local government elections where the voting rules do not allow an in-
cumbent to be reelected and ﬁnd increased spending caused by a change in federal
funding for local government. This spending leads to better education and health
outcomes, i.e. it seems not to be pure waste, as it should be in light of our theory.
One assumption made to allow for a consistent argument with respect to the
rationality of the voting rule at the end of the legislative period is that for the elec-
torate to be indifferent between the incumbent and the opposition, the electorate
only cares about the size of the budget. If one relaxes this assumption, the reelec-
tion rule set at the beginning of the legislative period would not be rational after
the budget has been revealed as in this case voters have an additional incentive to
keep the incumbent in power. A simple modiﬁcation to capture a situation whereExpert Politicians 28
the opposition has a different political platform would be to assume a one-off cost
of changing government, i.e., it is not continuous spending where parties differ
but some big projects that they propose. In such a model, the rents from power
are increased and as such our argument for a budget cap still prevails.Expert Politicians 29
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1









Furthermore, equation (5) implies that ˆ bf ! ¯ q if d ! 0. Finally, setting ˆ bf = 0 in









Proof of Lemma 1
First observe that if ˆ ba as determined by (7) is larger than ˆ ba as determined by (6),
the constraint on ˆ b does not bind. Second, observe that ˆ ba as determined by (7) is







1 d +d[F(ˆ ba)+ˆ baf(ˆ ba)]
⇤ < 0.
Third observe that ˆ ba as determined by (7) implies ˆ ba < ¯ q. Fourth and ﬁnally
observe that ˆ ba as determined by (6) implies that ˆ ba ! ¯ q if d ! 0 and ˆ ba ! 0 if
d ! 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
Since ˆ ba is bounded from below by condition (6) and ˆ ba as determined by condi-
tion (6) exceeds ˆ bf as determined by condition (5), it follows that ˆ ba > ˆ bf. Thus,
for q < ˆ bf it follows that ba = ˆ ba > bf = ˆ bf. For q 2 [ˆ bf,ˆ ba) it follows that
ba = ˆ ba > bf = q. For q 2 (ˆ ba, ¯ q) it follows that ba = ¯ q > bf = q. Only for
q 2{ˆ ba, ¯ q} it follows that ba = bf.Expert Politicians 30
Proof of Corollary 1
From Proposition 4 it is obvious that ¯ b⇤ < ¯ q. For d < ˜ d, the cutoff budget ˆ bc is
determined by the constraint (8) and ˆ bc < ¯ b⇤ directly follows from the fact that
F(ˆ bc) > 0. For d   ˜ d the cutoff budget ˆ bc is determined by the the ﬁrst order
condition (9). Assume, contrary to Corollary 1, that ˆ bc   ¯ b⇤. Then, it follows that
 F(ˆ bc) (ˆ bc  ¯ b⇤)f(ˆ bc) < 0,
which is contradictory to condition (9). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5
Evaluate (14) at ¯ b = ¯ q to ﬁnd that
dV
d¯ b
|¯ b= ¯ q < 0
if




The term in square brackets is negative if ˆ bo is determined by the constraint (12)
and vanishes if ˆ bo is determined by the ﬁrst order condition (13). Further, F( ¯ q) >
F(ˆ bo) and dˆ bo/d¯ b > 0 if ˆ bo is determined by the constraint (12). Thus, it follows
that dV/d¯ b < 0 for ¯ b = ¯ q. Q.E.D.Expert Politicians 31
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